Each volume offers essentially a collection of readings consisting of articles or excerpts from previously published books. As in all publications of this type, the selection of what is to be included or excluded depends on two factors: namely, on the purpose which the volumes are intended to serve; and, secondly, on the underlying philosophy of the editors.
The World Law Fund is a special project of the Institute of International Organization-a non-profit, tax-exempt, educational group. The Fund has the stated objective to foster "academic study and public discussion in every country throughout the World on the problems of war prevention." In itself, this is a worthwhile and unobjectionable purpose. However, since war prevention can be differently interpreted, it is necessary to establish clearly what the meaning of this term in the context of the publication under review is. The editors of these readings, Richard A. Falk, Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Professor of International Law at Rutgers University School of Law, tell us in the Preface to vol. 1 that in the four volumes "War is studied from a special point of view-its prevention-but in the spirit of social science rather than in the manner of a moralist or millenarian." (p. vii). In their compilation, both editors attempt basically to apply and elaborate on the philosophy of Harold D. Lasswell who wrote the Foreword to the entire set. Since the editors rely nearly exclusively on the philosophy and the ideas fathered by Lasswell, we shall have to examine them as far as they are relevant in this context.
The four volumes under review contain readings on the strategy of world order. In other words, they deal essentially with questions of how to establish a future warless world order rather than with the problem of whether such an order is politically feasible. However, if the answer to the question of political feasibility is in the affirm-ative, and this is obviously the assumption of the editors, their concentration on strategy, as understood by Falk-Mendlovitz, is used as an excuse to avoid the more basic problems. As we shall see below, whenever we are confronted with a theory of strategy, we have to ask ourselves first what the substantive purpose or goal of this strategy is. It is neither sufficient to say that it is world order, nor is it sufficient to characterize this order by a negative criterion, e.g., in our case: avoidance of war. The editors, then, by dealing exclusively with strategy avoid the principal problem, name. ly, the question of what the value-and socio-political foundations of this coming world order ought to be. This reticence of the two editors is even stranger since Professor Lasswell in his Foreword to the set calls their compilation of readings "congenial to the future-oriented outlook of modern man." Is it that the editors do not wish to face or to state the political implications of their strategy? In this connection, one cannot fail to be surprised that our two "future-oriented" editors excluded consideration of value-and socio-political problems by choosing to interpret the term strategy in, what they must surely consider to be, an old-fashioned narrow meaning of that term. May we not assume that everybody writing on contemporary strategy knows that no serious effort in this field can be made today without relating the particular exercise to a theory of grand-strategy, i.e., the art and science of utilizing all means for the realization of definite objectives, goals and purposes. We hope that the editors are not going to rely on their statement that they "conceive of world order as the strategy by which one system is transformed into another more in accord with a posited set of human values (e.g., survival, peace, welfare, human dignity)...." (Vol. 1, pp. vii, viii) . The editors refer to this transformation process as "the essence of this undertaking." They cannot seriously suggest that they conceive of world order only as a strategy of transformation of the presently existing system-whatever its shortcomings may be-into a hypothetically assumed "new international system capable of war prevention." (Vol. 1, p. 1). The seriousness of their own suggestions is greatly jeopardized by the precautions they take in noting that their model has not been selected "as an expression of [their] ideological preference .. " (Vol. 1, p. vii) . This can only mean one thing: the readings have been selected for the purpose of indoctrinating us with a strategy of transformation into a warless system-regardless of what the foundations and the structure of that system are going to be. The point concerning indoctrination is proved by Professor Lasswell's statement in his Foreword to the set, namely, that "It is entirely appropriate that such a program should spread among professional and graduate schools, and ultimately permeate college and pre-college days." It should be noted in this connection that Lasswell's preference for indoctrination rather than education has not only been developed in connection with the problems discussed here. His early writings in 1935 and 1936 were already partly investigations into the social function of myths and he elaborated already at that time the importance of belief in one's mission. In the course of the last decades, he applied his particular conception of belief in one's mission to applied social science-as he understands it. The volumes under review are, therefore, by no means, as we shall see below, the detached objective approach they pretend to be. They are expressions of belief regarding the re-making of the basic nature of man. The second of the above mentioned points, namely, that regarding value neutrality, is again proved by the more propagandistic than professional assertion in the Foreword that "The general editors have no intention of initiating or conducting the world forum on terms that preclude participation by men and women of many preferential maps. Only those who love war and dominion as ends in themselves and who despise inquiry will find no hospitality between the limits of the present undertaking." (Our emphasis). We hope that it is not too bold to ask to whom the invitation and castigation are respectively addressed.
Professor Lasswell is fascinated by thinking which anticipates "the pattern of coming things." He believes that the editors of these readings are to be commended on this score and also remarks in passing that "The necessity of looking forward is now conceded even in relatively conservative circles." As a matter of fact, the necessity to look forward is one of the outstanding features of conservatism since it is convinced of the organic character of society. It is probably sufficient to point out that good military planning, on which Lasswell and the editors will frown as being the very manifestation of everything they wish to see exorcised, has been based on the very necessity "to look forward." However, this misunderstanding can easily be explained: Professor Lasswell committed the error of confusing conservatism and reaction.
In this connection, Lasswell refers also to a series of essays edited by Bertrand de Jouvenel I and to a work by Frederick L. Polak, 2 whom he introduces as a "prominent figure in Dutch planning." It may be more to the point to state that Dr. Polak is Professor of Sociology at the Netherlands School of Economics and, specifically, that his important book is one of the studies concerned with European integration which have been sponsored by the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, not only does neither book bear witness to what Lasswell has in mind; they actually reject the approach used in the volumes under review. We believe it to be sufficient to let Professor Polak speak for himself. He has this to say: "I will therefore pass over most efforts of recent decades to capture political events in a scientific net, as being irrelevant to our frame of reference, I am somewhat acquainted with the extensive analytic literature in this field." He then adds in a footnote on the same page: "For example, the attempt to build up a special science of politics (Laski in England, Lasswell in America)....,a Since the editors of these volumes insist that their collection consists of readings in strategy of world order, we have to make an attempt to place them in the terms of reference which they themselves invoke. Robert A. Levine in his The Arms Debate (1963) has established two useful categories for classifying authors and editors of books dealing with strategy. The first category deals, as we have already noted, with placing the purpose and the goal of the suggested strategy. In this category we find the entire spectrum reaching from the strategy of the pacifists who want to abolish war (and, specifically, thermonuclear war) to the strategy of extreme ideological anti-communism. The second category is used to evaluate and place the probable effects which the suggested strategy wishes or hopes to bring about. Here Levine dis- [Vol. XVI tinguishes between minimalists, whose aim is a compromise between conflicting interests, and maximalists, who advocate a strategy leading to total change. By combining these two categories, Levine then establishes five groups reaching from systemic anti-war strategies which advocate anti-war maximalism to systemic anti-communist maximalism. The statements made by the editors in the volumes under review leave no doubt that they have to be classified as belonging to the group designated as anti-war maximalism. Levine mentions Bertrand Russell in his book as the outstanding representative of this group. The volumes under review reveal themselves as readings dedicated to indoctrinate us with the thinking of the strategic master plan for winning the war for a warless world by avoiding war. Is this really "future oriented" thinking? Does it not rather pathetically recall the great Wilsonian idea of the First World War which was fought presumably to end all wars? Does it not remind us of the strategy of total change advocated during the Civil War which Roosevelt revived at a press conference in Casablanca, when he coined, to Churchill's surprise, the fateful phrase of "unconditional surrender"? Is the approach of the editors not an untimely reminder of the motivations leading to the founding of the Federation of American Scientists whose principal organ is the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. Reminiscing, Professor Rabinovitch, who was one of the prime movers in both undertakings, said in the January, 1961, issue of the Bulletin that these two ventures were part of a conspiracy whose purpose it was to save civilization by frightening people sufficiently to make them behave "rationally." Although serious strategic thinking has laid to rest this ghost which was intended to "frighten" people a long time ago, the editors still believe in it. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us explore what Rabinovitch, Lasswell, and the editors understand by " rational" behavior. David Singer in his Foreword to the Fourth Volume of these readings to which he not inaccurately refers as "my sermon," "preaches" that the only saving grace lies in eschewing metaphysical irrelevancies and in treating war "as a problem in applied social science." It seems that Professor Singer erred rather in the latter part of his Foreword than in his intuitively correct reference to it as a "sermon." He deplores "(T)hat some of the papers in these volumes do not fully reflect the problem-solving outlook ... " which he, the editors and Lasswell recommend. One of the contributions which somehow found its way into this collection is an excerpt from Man, the State and War by Kenneth N. Waltz. We let him enlighten us on the editors' understanding of "rational behavior" into which we have to be "frightened." Waltz also reveals to us the reason why we have to be "frightened" into it: because it is, as "rational" behavior is understood by the editors, not part of man's natural make-up. Waltz has this to say in the excerpt included in the volumes under review:
According to one view of international relations, the locus of the major causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars, according to this image of the world, result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity, from lack of information; other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the primary causes of war, then an end to war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment .... It is the leitmotif of many modern-day behavioral scientists as well .... One may, however, agree with the first-image analysis of causes without admitting the possibility of meaningful prescription for their removal. St. Augustine attributes to man's love for 'so many vain and hurtful things' a long list of human tribulations, ranging from quarrels and robberies to murders and war. The explanation is for him an unbreakable one, going beyond any man-made remedy. Man's sin explains both the necessity of political constraints and the necessarily defective quality of all political institutions. With many states, he once wrote, we have wars among them; given a world state, we would have wars within it. (Vol. 1, pp. 141-42) .
St. Augustine's view was essentially shared by George Santayana in his Reason In Society. The great American legal philosopher, Morris R. Cohen, once said about Santayana's book that "It is the only comprehensive, carefully articulated philosophy of life and civilization which has been produced on these shores." In his book, Santayana makes the following point: "If war could be abolished and the defence of all interests entrusted to courts of law, there would remain unsatisfied a primary and therefore ineradicable instinct-a love of conflict, of rivalry, and of victory. If we desire to abolish war because it tries to do good by doing harm, we must not ourselves do any injury to human nature while trying to smooth it out. Now the test and limit of all necessary reform is vital harmony." 4 However, probably the most incisive analysis of this type of "rationality" comes from the sociologist, Karl Mannheim, who certainly tended to lean in the direction of the ideas expressed in the volumes under review. He distinguishes between two types of rationality. He calls the first type "substantial rationality." This means what we usually understand by using the term "rationality", namely, "an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight." However, he then continues: "But in sociology as well as in everyday language, we also use the word 'rational' in still another sense when we say, for instance, that this or that industry or administration staff has been 'rationalized.' In such cases we do not at all understand .... but rather that a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role .... If, therefore, in the definition of functional rationality, emphasis is laid on the co-ordination of action with reference to a definite goal, everything which breaks through and disrupts this functional ordering is functionally irrational." 5 This second type of rationality which we find in the set under review is, then, "functional rationality." The editors of our volumes leave no doubt in our mind that they have established one goal for themselves-to transform human society, if they only could, into a warless system and to re-shape man and the order in which he lives accordingly. But what would be the results if they were to achieve their goals? Mannheim has given the answer: The effect would be a decrease of substantial rationality (see above) since in such a contingency "The average person surrenders part of his own cultural individuality with every new act of integration into a functionally rationalized complex of [Vol. XVI activities. He becomes increasingly accustomed to being led by others and gradually gives up his own interpretation of events for those which others give him." 6 The philosophy of Lasswell and of the editors, if applied, has, therefore, in spite of their protestations at least a tendency to move in the direction of a totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian set-up. This is the more the case since the required attitude is as St. Augustine and Santayana, to select only two great thinkers, have shown, contrary to human nature and would require not only social but human engineering. The danger is that we have today, as all of us know, the tools to make such attempts, which, although they cannot change human nature, can cripple and stifle it-and thereby upset Santayana's "vital harmony" for a prolonged period of time. Let us in this connection only direct attention to Jacques Ellul's recent book on Propaganda, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1965) and to the symposium Control of the Mind, (McGrawHill, 1961) . Lasswell participated in this symposium and had to admit that: "Our civilization is a culture characterized by the manipulation anxieties of all who play a professional role in strategy, and of the millions who perceive, with many gradations of dimness or clarity, that they are strategic targets."7 However, these anxieties are exactly, as we know, the psychological breeding ground of wars.
The first volume of our set deals with the strategic doctrine which the editors wish to see promoted. The following volumes are devoted to documenting the means or, since the editors speak of strategy, the weapons by which the transformation process is to be achieved. In the second volume, we find readings on international law which have been carefully selected to fit the editors' preferences. The third volume deals with the United Nations. Here again, we find in Chapter II a purpose-directed or, as the editors would say: "rational," selection of readings dealing with "the relevance of law to the operations of the United Nations." Finally, the last volume deals with the "weapons" of disarmament and economic development.
Let us shortly turn to volume two dealing with international law. In the introduction to this volume, it is pointed out that it will deal with international law as a means of transformation of the present situation into another international system. The editors offer the following explanation of their approach to the meaning of law:
Law is looked upon both as a body of rules and standards regulating the behavior of nation-states, and also as a set of procedures for generating, applying and transforming such rules and standards. (Vol. 2, p. 1). This is followed on the same page by the assertion that:
International law... have always mingled a concern for the attainment of actual order with a quest for a system of ideal order. (Vol. 2, p. 1) . Surprisingly, the editors confuse here legal philosophy dealing with legal desiderata de lege ferenda with lex lata. As every lawyer knows, this is a dangerous game which tends to undermine the principal social purpose of all law: certainty and predictability. The editors then make the rather bold assertion that: 0 ld. at 59. (Farber ed. 1961) .
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